● CVE-2024-26584 / High Severity

CVE-2024-26584: Linux Kernel TLS Subsystem Use-After-Free Teardown

How an asynchronous cryptographic callback race condition in net/tls/tls_sw.c freed network pages while still queued for zero-copy transmission.

💡 Einfache Erklärung (ELI5)

Imagine you order a meal for delivery. The chef starts cooking, but you call and cancel the order. Because the kitchen staff wasn't notified properly, the delivery driver picks up an empty plate, drives to a new customer's house, and serves them whatever was left on the counter, contaminating the new customer's food.

Kernkonzepte und Subsystem-Begriffe

Kernel TLS (kTLS)
Linux kernel facility to perform symmetric TLS encryption/decryption directly inside the network socket layer for maximum throughput.
Zero-Copy Networking
Transmitting data directly from application buffers to the network card without intermediate CPU memory copying.
Asynchronous Crypto (aead_request)
Offloading cryptographic AES-GCM operations to asynchronous hardware accelerators.
Slab Corruption
Corrupting Linux kernel slab cache structures (`kmalloc-512`), destabilizing kernel execution.

Schritt-für-Schritt Angriffsmechanik

Step 1

1. Open kTLS Socket

The attacker creates a TLS socket and enables kernel encryption offload via setsockopt(TCP_ULP, "tls").

Step 2

2. Submit Asynchronous Zero-Copy Payload

The attacker sends data using MSG_ZEROCOPY, queuing pages for hardware crypto.

Step 3

3. Abrupt Socket Teardown

The attacker closes the socket before the crypto accelerator completes its async callback.

Step 4

4. Kernel Memory Corruption

The cleanup handler frees memory pages that the delayed hardware callback subsequently overwrites.

Quellcode: Kritische Schwachstelle vs. Sichere Behebung

In lesbarem High-Level-Quellcode bereitgestellt (kein rohes Assembler oder Binär-Diff).

UNGEPATCHTE SCHWACHSTELLE
// VULNERABLE: net/tls/tls_sw.c before patch
static void tls_encrypt_done(void *data, int err) {
    struct tls_context *ctx = data;
    struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx_tx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(ctx);

    // ROOT CAUSE:
    // Asynchronous completion callback assumes socket context is still locked!
    // If the socket was closed while crypto was in flight, ctx_tx is already freed!
    clear_bit(TLS_TX_SYNC_MORE, &ctx_tx->tx_bitmask);
    tls_free_open_rec(ctx);
}
GEHÄRTETER PATCH
// SECURE: net/tls/tls_sw.c patch
static void tls_encrypt_done(void *data, int err) {
    struct tls_context *ctx = data;
    
    // 1. Verify context reference counter before dereferencing context pointers
    if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&ctx->refcount)) {
        return; // Socket is already dying, abort callback safely!
    }
    
    struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx_tx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(ctx);
    clear_bit(TLS_TX_SYNC_MORE, &ctx_tx->tx_bitmask);
    tls_free_open_rec(ctx);
    
    // 2. Drop reference cleanly
    refcount_dec(&ctx->refcount);
}

Engineering-Checkliste zur Systemhärtung

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