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Когда Rust перестает быть безопасным: блоки unsafe и переполнение буфера в smallvec

Critical — CVSS 9.8 CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write RUSTSEC-2021-0003 · CVE-2021-25900
Простыми словами (ELI5)

Склад считается эталоном надежности: робот сканирует каждую полку перед укладкой груза. Но для пары редких операций робота отключают и рабочий делает все вручную. Рабочий спросил у шофера 'примерно сколько коробок?', сколотил полку наугад и стал грузить. Оценка шофера оказалась неточной — излишек коробок с грохотом обрушил соседние стеллажи.

Illustrative reconstruction of the pattern, not the crate's literal source. The upstream fix reserved additional space per inserted item and simplified the implementation specifically so its correctness would be easier to verify.

What this says about Rust's guarantee

Rust's memory-safety guarantee is real but conditional, and the condition is usually stated imprecisely. The accurate formulation is: safe Rust cannot cause undefined behaviour, provided every unsafe block it depends on is sound.

That shifts where the risk lives rather than eliminating it. In C, memory-safety bugs can appear anywhere in millions of lines. In Rust, they can only originate inside unsafe blocks — typically a very small fraction of a codebase. This is an enormous practical improvement: it makes the auditable surface small enough to actually audit. But "small" is not "zero", and a soundness bug inside that surface is exploitable exactly like its C equivalent, as the CVSS 9.8 here reflects.

There is a second, subtler point. unsafe is not locally contained. An unsound unsafe block poisons every safe API built on top of it — which is why this bug affected callers who never wrote the keyword.

The rules for writing unsafe correctly

FAQ

Does this mean Rust's safety claims are overstated?

No — it means they are conditional in a way worth understanding precisely. Rust confines memory-safety defects to a small, explicitly marked, auditable portion of a codebase, which is a substantial structural improvement over a language where any line can contain one. The claim that survives scrutiny is "dramatically smaller attack surface", not "no attack surface".

Is there a way to make a trait trustworthy for unsafe code?

Yes — that is what unsafe trait is for. Implementing one is an explicit promise that carries safety obligations, which lets unsafe code rely on it. The standard library's TrustedLen exists for exactly this iterator-length problem, though it remains unstable.

How do I find unsafe code in my dependencies?

cargo geiger reports unsafe usage across a dependency tree, and cargo audit flags known advisories. Neither proves soundness, but together they show you where the risk is concentrated.

Related reading

Источники и официальные бюллетени