flawopen.com/path-traversal/Kotlin

● CWE-918 · 高危
安全研究 · FlawOpen

漏洞深度剖析：Path Traversal in Kotlin

How unvalidated file paths in Kotlin/Ktor allow directory breakouts, and how to verify boundaries using Path.normalize and Path.startsWith.

💡 通俗易懂的原理解析 (ELI5)

设想一家酒店的房卡扫描锁原本只允许开启二楼的客房。如果客人在门禁键盘上输入 '../../master-safe'，有缺陷的门锁就会跳出当前楼道，直接打开酒店经理办公室的主保险箱。

核心概念与专有名词

Web Application Security
技术概念 (Web Application Security)：Core architecture component affected by CWE-918.
CWE-918
技术概念 (CWE-918)：Standard Common Weakness Enumeration classification for path-traversal-kotlin.
Defense-in-Depth
技术概念 (Defense-in-Depth)：Multi-layered engineering verification and runtime boundary isolation.

攻击执行流程分解

Step 1

客户端提交文件路径参数

应用程序接口通过 HTTP 参数接收用户指定的文件名、报告路径或静态资源标识。

Step 2

目录遍历序列注入

攻击者在文件名参数中注入相对路径遍历符号（如 '../', '..%2f'）或绝对路径覆盖。

Step 3

文件系统根目录边界逃逸

后端直接将不可信输入与基础目录拼接，未进行规范化绝对路径解析（Canonicalization）与边界校验。

Step 4

敏感文件未授权读取或覆盖

系统运行时打开并回传敏感配置文件（如 /etc/passwd、源码凭证、环境变量密钥），造成数据外泄。

源代码对比：漏洞与安全实现

✕ 存在漏洞的实现
// VULNERABLE: Direct File instantiation with user parameter
import java.io.File;
import javax.servlet.http.*;

public class FileServlet extends HttpServlet {
    private static final File BASE_DIR = new File("/var/app/public/files");

    protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest req, HttpServletResponse resp) {
        String filename = req.getParameter("file");
        // Attacker sends: ../../../../etc/passwd
        File target = new File(BASE_DIR, filename);

        // Directly serves arbitrary system file!
        serveFile(target, resp);
    }
}
✓ 加固后的安全修复
// HARDENED: Canonicalize file and enforce directory prefix check
import java.io.File;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import javax.servlet.http.*;

public class FileServlet extends HttpServlet {
    private static final File BASE_DIR = new File("/var/app/public/files");

    protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest req, HttpServletResponse resp) throws IOException {
        String filename = req.getParameter("file");
        if (filename == null || filename.isBlank()) {
            resp.sendError(HttpServletResponse.SC_BAD_REQUEST);
            return;
        }

        // 1. Resolve canonical path (resolves .. and all symlinks)
        File target = new File(BASE_DIR, filename).getCanonicalFile();
        File canonicalBase = BASE_DIR.getCanonicalFile();

        // 2. Strict boundary check using Java NIO Path
        if (!target.toPath().startsWith(canonicalBase.toPath())) {
            resp.sendError(HttpServletResponse.SC_FORBIDDEN, "Path traversal detected");
            return;
        }

        if (!target.isFile()) {
            resp.sendError(HttpServletResponse.SC_NOT_FOUND);
            return;
        }
        serveFile(target, resp);
    }
}

工程与系统安全加固清单

References