flawopen.com/Teardowns/cve-2021-22960-nodejs-llhttp-request-smuggling
CVE-2021-22960 源代码级技术深度解析与系统加固工程指南:深入剖析漏洞触发条件、攻击利用链条与加固补丁的具体实现。
通俗原理解析:Imagine a two-window ticket booth. Window 1 reads: 'One ticket for Alice'. Window 2 reads: 'Wait, there's another ticket for Bob glued to the back'. Because Window 1 ignored the extra ticket, Bob's ticket sits in the window until Charlie walks up. Charlie gets handed Bob's ticket and private receipt, allowing an attacker to steal user sessions.
llhttpHTTP Request SmugglingChunked Transfer-Encoding0\r\n\r\n chunk.Chunk Extensions0;extension=value\r\n).根本原因在于开源系统中未经验证的边界参数,导致状态不同步并绕过安全控制。
技术利用机制与执行路径分析:The attacker sends an HTTP request with chunk extensions containing unescaped control characters.
技术利用机制与执行路径分析:The frontend proxy treats the entire payload as a single continuous request body.
技术利用机制与执行路径分析:Node.js's llhttp stops parsing prematurely, leaving the smuggled second request in the TCP buffer.
技术利用机制与执行路径分析:The next innocent user's request is prepended to the smuggled request, exfiltrating their session tokens.
// VULNERABLE: deps/llhttp/src/llhttp.c before patch
int llhttp__on_chunk_extension(llhttp_t *parser, const char *p, const char *end) {
// ROOT CAUSE:
// Does not enforce strict ASCII validation on chunk extension tokens!
// Tolerates invalid whitespace and carriage return sequences, desyncing from proxies!
while (p < end && *p != '\r' && *p != '\n') {
p++; // Skips unvetted extension bytes
}
return 0;
}
// SECURE: deps/llhttp/src/llhttp.c patch
int llhttp__on_chunk_extension(llhttp_t *parser, const char *p, const char *end) {
// 1. Strictly validate characters inside chunk extensions according to RFC 9112
while (p < end && *p != '\r' && *p != '\n') {
uint8_t ch = (uint8_t)*p;
// Disallow spaces, control codes, and invalid token bytes
if (ch <= 0x20 || ch >= 0x7F || ch == ';') {
return HPE_INVALID_CHUNK_SIZE; // Reject immediately!
}
p++;
}
return 0;
}